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Pursuant to Rule 76(e), appellant moves this court to 
reconsider its decision in this matter. In support of this motion, 
appellant relies on the following points and authorities. 
POINT ONE 
RECONSIDERATION IS MANDATORY 
BECAUSE THE COURT HAS NOT YET 
RULED ON CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES 
Appellant (hereafter Call) presented a subdivision plat 
to respondent (hereafter West Jordan) for approval. Pursuant to 
a local ordinance, West Jordan required Call to pay $16,576.00 in 
order to proceed with the subdivision. Thereafter, Call filed 
suit to challenge that payment. In part Call alleged, inter 
alia, that: 
17. The defendant has required the named 
plaintiffs, in accordance with Ordinance No. 33 
of West Jordan, to pay the sum of Sixteen Thousand 
Dollars ($16,000.00) to the City of West Jordan 
for the public purpose of flood control and/or 
parks and recreation. 
18. Plaintiffs have received no compensation 
for such payment, and the above taking was made 
without the commencement of any action for eminent 
domain by the City of West Jordan. 
19. Other Plaintiffs within the class have 
been required to dedicate land or pay money to 
the City of West Jordan under Ordinance No. 33. 
No compensation has been received by such plaintiffs 
for the land dedicated or payments made and no 
actions for eminent domain have been instituted 
by the City of West Jordan. 
20. The actions of the defendant in requiring 
the dedication of land or payment of money as a 
condition for app~oval of a subdivision constitute 
the taking of private property for public use without 
just compensation, in violation of the Utah Const. 
art. I, § 22, and the U.S. Const. amend. v. 
See also paragraphs 23 through 27 of the Complaint for 
:onstitutional challenges on other grounds. 
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The constitutional issues were duly briefed 
and Prese· 
to the court. (See Brief of Appellant p. 10-30, and Reply Brie 
of Appellant p. 21-25.) 
Two members of this court have written that the City 
ordinance is not unconstitutional. (See .'1aj ori ty Opinion at 
p. 5 of Green Slip Opinion.) Two other members of the court hav,
1 
written that the city ordinance is unconstitutional. (See 
Dissenting Opinion at p. l 7 and 18 of Green Slip Opinion.) 
If we read the opinion correctly, that makes a two· , 
two tie on the constitutional issues. It appears that t~e fi::: 
justice (and the swing vote) is still neutral on the constitut;~ 
issue. 
STEN ART, Justice: (Concurring) 
However, the ordinance in question clearly 
approaches constitutionally protected rights, 
i.e., the prohibition against the taking of 
private property without the compensation. 
The power of a city, or for that matter of 
the state, to require subdividers to dedicate 
a portion of their land for public improve-
ments is not without limitation. In my judg-
ment, the Court should address the problem 
of what standards delineate a constitutional 
and unconstitutional force of dedication by 
a subdivider. The question is certainly one 
that will recur and ought to be resolved by 
the Court. 
Green Slip Opinion at p.7. 
Thus, the critical constitutional issue remains unced 
by this court's opinion. 
-2-
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:I 
POINT TWO 
THE ISSUES ALREADY DECIDED BY 
THE COURT WILL BE MOOT IF THE 
WEST JORDAN ORDINANCE IS FOUND 
TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A crucial issue in this case was whether West Jordan 
had power to enact local ordinance 9-C-8(a). In a three-two decision, 
this court has ruled that the ordinance was authorized under the 
general grant of "police power." (§ 10-8-84 U.C.A.) 
However, that ruling is moot if the ordinance itself is 
unconstitutional. Or, in other words, the State of Utah did not 
(and indeed cannot) delegate power to the City of West Jordan to 
pass an unconstitutional ordinance. As the court stated in Pioneer 
Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, et al., 176 
N.E.2d 800 (Ill. 1961). 
Is it reasonable that a subdivider should be 
required under the guise of a police power 
regulation to dedicate a portion of his 
property to public use; or does this amount 
to a veiled exercise of the power of eminent 
domain and a confiscation of private property 
behind the defense of police regulations? 
Of similar import see Colis v. City of Bloomington, 
2 4 6 N . w. 2 d 19 , 2 6 (Minn . 19 7 6 ) . 
While in general subdivision regulations 
are a valid exercise of the police power, made 
necessary by the problems subdivisions create--
i. e., greater needs for municipal services and 
facilities--, the possibility of arbitrariness 
and unfairness in their application is nonethe-
less substantial: A municipality could use dedi-
cation regulations to exact land or fees from a 
subdivider far out of proportion to the needs 
created by his subdivision in order to avoid 
imposing the burden of paying for additional 
services on all citizens via taxation. To 
tolerate this situation would be to allow 
an otherwise acceptable exercise of police power 
to become grand theft. 
-3-
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See also Land/Vest Properties, Inc. T v · own of 
Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 203 (N.H. 1977). 
As an exercise of ~he state's police power, 
however, such condition [subdivider's 
dedication of property] must not only be 
reasonably necessary to protect the public 
safety but also otherwise constitutional. 
POINT THREE 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEST IS 
SATISFIED ONLY IF THERE IS A 
"RATIONAL NEXUS" BETWEEN THE 
NEEDS CREATED BY THE SUBDIVISION 
AND THE SEVEN PER CENT FEE 
We begin the analysis by noting that "flood control, 
parks and recreation" are a bit like motherhood--everyone is in 
favor. Indeed, no one can gainsay the majority's view that: 
Just how essential and desirable it is 
that cities have such authority in planning 
their growth is brought into sharp focus by 
reflecting, on the one hand, upon the conditions 
in the slum and ghetto areas of various cities, 
where there are none, or inadequate, parks and 
playgrounds and, on the other, upon the enrich-
ment of life which has been conferred on other 
cities where there are parks, plazas, recreational 
and cultural areas (some of which are very famous) 
for the use of the public. (Green Slip Opinion at p. 4.) 
It should be clear enough that appellant is not again: 
"flood control, parks and recreation. " The issue is how to fair: 
finance such laudable goals. As Mr. Justice Holmes has stated: 
The protection of private property in the 
Fifth Amendment presupposes that it is 
wanted for public use, but provides that it 
shall not be taken for such use without 
compensation. A similar assumption is made 
in the decisions upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. [Citation omitted.] When this 
seemingly absolute protection is found to 
be qualified by the police power, the . 
natural tendency of human nature is to extena 
the qualification more and more until at 
-4-
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last private property disappears. But that 
cannot be accomplished under the constitution 
of the United States .... A strong desire 
to improve the public condition is not enough 
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter 
cut than the constitutional way of paying for 
the change. 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 43 s.ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322. 
Thus, competing interests clash. On one hand, there 
is a public interest in improving the community. On the other 
hand, there is a personal interest in the control and ownership 
of private property. The courts have devised a constitutional test 
which balances those competing interests: 
If the need is generated by the subdivider's 
own activities, i.e., by the subdivision of land 
for the purpose of its development by dwellings 
to be sold, transferred, rented to, and occupied 
by persons who will directly benefit from the 
installation of improvements, then the consti-
tutionally required relation to the public 
health, safety, morales and general welfare 
has been established. 
Rathkopf, 3 The Law of Zoning and Planning, 
Chap. 71 at p. 55 (3d Ed. 1972). 
The vast majority of all cases have, with some minor 
variations, adopted the Rathkopf test. 
Accordingly, we conclude that where 
offsite improvements can properly be re-
quired of a subdivider, the subdivider can 
be compelled "only to bear that portion of 
the cost which bears a rational nexus to 
the needs created by, and [special] benefits 
conferred upon, the subdivision. 
Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town 
of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204 
(N. Hamp. 1977). 
If the requirement is within the statutory 
grant of power to the municipality and if 
the burden cast upon the subdivider is 
specifically and uniquely attributable to 
his activity, then the requirement is 
permissible; if not, it is forbidden and 
amounts to a confiscation of private 
-5-
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property in contravention of the consti-
tutional prohibitions rather than reasonable 
regulation under the police power. 
Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village 
of Mount Prospect et al., 176 N.E.2d 
800 (Ill. 1961). 
But the plain rationale of these cases is that 
a subdivider may be compelled only to 
assume a cost which bears a rational nexus to 
the needs created by, and benefits conferred 
upon, the subdivision . . . Beyond that, 
Planning Board impositions, although purportedly 
authorized by the Planning Act or the local -
ordinance, amount to impermissible exactions. 
Brazer v. Borough of Mountainside, 
262 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1970). 
We have heretofore held in this opinion 
that the involuntary dedication of land is a 
valid exercise of the police power only to the 
extent that the need for the land required to 
be donated results from the specific and unique 
activity attributable to the developer. The 
validity of a requirement of a voluntary 
donation being so limited, we think a regulation 
requiring a donation of "at least 7%" is clearly 
arbitrary on its face. 
Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 
264 A.2d 910 (Rhode Is. 1970). 
The test which has been generally applied 
in determining whether a requirement that a 
developer set aside land for parks and play-
grounds as a prerequisite to the approval of 
a subdivision plan is whether the burden cast 
upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely 
attributable to his own activity. Where the 
requirement is uniquely attributable co the 
subdivider's activitv, it has been held to be 
a perrnissable exercise of the police power. 
Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Plan~inq 
Commission, 273 A. 2d 880 (Conn. 1910) · 
See also: 
Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108 (Ore. 1960); 
Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 481 P.2d 401 
(N. Mex. 1971); 
State ex rel. Noland v. St. Louis County, 
478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1972); 
Admiral Development v. City of Maitland, 
267 So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1972): 
·city of ~eguon v. Lake Estates Co., 
190 N.W.2d 912 (Wis. 1971) · 
-6-
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Cf.: 
Cimrnaron Corp. v. Board of County Commissioners, 
563 P. 2d 945 (Colo. 1977); 
City of ~1ontgoIT\ery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 
3 6 3 (Ala. 19 7 8) ; 
Krughoff v. Naperville, 369 N.E.2d a92 (Ill. 1977); 
Collis v. Bloomington, 246 N. W. 2d 19 (Minn. 1976); 
Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 
394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964). 
POINT FOUR 
THE SHORTCOMING OF THE MAJORITY 
OPINION CAN BE DEMONSTRATED BY 
A SINGLE EXAMPLE 
The majority opionion pays lio service to the doctrine 
discussed in Point Three. 
We agree that the dedication should have 
some reasonable relationship to the needs created 
by the subdivision. 
Green Sheet Opinion at p. 4. 
However, the majority gives with the right hand, but takes away 
with the left hand. A single example will demonstrate the short-
coming of the majority view. 
A. The Example. 
Suppose that the old-time citizens (old-timers) of town 
are clamoring for a new playground. For the most part, the old-
timers live on the south side of town, and they want the new play-
ground located in their south-side neightborhood. It is estimated 
that the cost of the new playground will be $10,000. However, 
the old-timers do not want their taxes increased. 
At that same time, Mr. Subdivider walks in the door to 
get his new subdivision approved for the north side of town. 
The mayor (wishing to get re-elected) sees an opportunity to get 
-7-
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the needed $10,000. The town approves the new subdivis· ion on :: 
condition that the subdivider will pay a $10,000 fee. 
The subdivider (having no real choice) pays the Slo, 
to get his subdivision approved for the north side of tow 
n. Th: 
town collects the $10,000 and thereby finances a new nlayg 
" round 
for the old-timers on the south side of town. Of course, north·: 
children are free to use the south-side playground. But, it is 
away, and few of them do so. 
In this example, the old-time residents found a de•i:: 
by which new residents would finance improvements (in this case 
a playground) which was for the primary benefit of the old-tim!:. 
Although they paid the bill, the new residents got little or ns 
value from the playground on the other side of town. 
B. Application of the Example to the Facts of this 
Case. 
The majority opinion presumes that there is some 
difference between the example above and the facts of this case 
The opinion presumes that West Jordan needs some new parks, 
playgrounds or flood control. The opinion presumes that the 
normal sources of revenue are insufficient to finance the imprC' 
men ts. The opinion presumes that the town has some plan in mh 
(or on paper) to provide the improvements. The opinion presume: 
that the improvements will benefit every part of town (not ius: 
the old-timers). The opinion presumes that a fee of 7% (tim~: 
total number of new subdivisions) will equal the cost of the 
improvements. 
-8-
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The trouble is that the foregoing is all guesswork. 
There is absolutely no factual development to confirm how, when 
or where the money will be used. For all we really know, the 
entire $16,576 from appellants will be used to build a play-
ground for the old-timers ten miles from the new subdivision. 
In anticipation of this problem, the majority tells us: 
... that it will be used for its 
stated purpose is assured, first, by 
the integrity and good faith of the 
public officials charged with that 
responsibility; and second, by the 
fact that the recognized principle 
is that if money is collected from the 
public for a specific purpose, it be-
comes a trust fund committed to the 
carrying out of that purpose. 
However, those truisms won't work. There is not one 
word in the ordinance which would prohibit West Jordan from 
using the entire $16,576 to build a new playground ten miles from 
the new subdivision. Or, stated in other words, West Jordan can 
in full good faith, and without breaching any trust, spend the 
$16,576 anywhere in town. The constitutional safeguard lies in the 
words of the ordinance--not the good faith of the officials! 
In this regard, it is instructive to compare the 
language of the West Jordan ordinance with the Walnut Creek!/ 
ordinance. 
City of West Jordan 
Section 9-C-B(a). In addition to all 
other requirements prescribed under this 
ordinance the subdivider shall be required 
to dedicate seven per cent (7.0%) of the 
land of the proposed subdivision to the 
l/The majority opinion relies heavily upon the case of Associated 
Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc., v. Walnut Creek, 94 Cal. 
RiJfr. 6 3 8 , 4 8 4 p . 2 d 6 0 6 (19 71 ) . 
-9-
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public use for the benefit of the 
citizens of West Jordan . . . or in 
the alternative at the option of the 
governing body of the City, the City 
may accept the equivalent value of the 
land in cash if it deems advisable. 
Section 9-C-8(b). The monies received 
by the City as a result of [this ordinance] 
... shall be used by the City for its 
flood control and/or parks and recreation 
facilities. 
Walnut Creek 
(c) The land, fees, or combination 
thereof are to be used only for the purpose 
of providing park or recreational facilities 
to serve the subdivision. 
(e) The amount and location of land 
to be dedicated or the fees to be paid shall 
bear a reasonable relationship to the use of 
the park and recreational facilities by the 
future inhabitants of the subdivision. 
Walnut Creek, 
Based on specific language of the statute, tl'le cour: 
in Walnut Creek said: 
;mether or !'lot such a direct connection 
is required by constitutional considerations, 
Section 11546 provides the nexus which concerns 
[the developer] Associated. The act requires 
that the land dedicated or the fees paid are 
to be used only for the purpose of providing 
park or recreational facilities ... [and] 
that the amount and location of land or fees 
shall bear a reasonable relationship to the 
use of the facilities by the future inhabitants 
of the subdivision. 
Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d at 612. 
It seems obvious that the Walnut Creek case is no 
precedent for this case. 
The West Jordan ordinance is so broad and general as 
to be almost meaningless. It is no answer to contend that the 
money was illegally taken but wisely spent (Robin Hood). This 
-10-
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case does not attack the manner of spending. This case attacks 
the ordinance under which the money was taken. 
POINT FIVE 
NO RECORDED CASE SUPPORTS THE 
CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE MAJORITY 
The "majority" opinion cites a number of cases in 
support of its conclusion. However, no recorded case has 
stretched the Constitution as far as this case. 
There are perhaps two or three dozen cases to be 
considered in analyzing this matter. Yet each case construes 
the language of a different statute or ordinance. In each case, 
the form of taking (or dedication of property) is different. In 
each case, the land or money was used in a different fashion. 
Thus, the concept of precedent is particularly elusive in this 
case. 
For example, the majority relies primarily on the case 
of Associated Home Builders, Inc., v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 
P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971). As we have pointed out in Point Four above, 
that case relies upon an ordinance substantially different from 
the ordinance before this court. Likewise, the majority relies 
on the case of Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949). 
In that case, the developer challenged a requirement concerning the 
width of certain streets within the subdivision. Factually, that 
presents a much different problem than this case. Here, the city 
ordinance exacts a cash fee which goes into the general fund of 
the city. In like fashion, other cases cited by the majority are 
each distinguishable on their peculiar facts. 
-11-
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In our research, we have found no reported 
case •hi,: 
has approved an ordinance as broad and indiscriminate 
as the ':i:: 
Jordan ordinance now before this court. 
In surveying the various cases, it appears that t~ 
closest case factually is the case of Admiral Development Cor: 
::..:.:.t' 
v. City of Maitland, 267 So. 2d 860 (Fla. App. 1972). That cas: 
reviewed a city ordinance virtually identical to the West Jordt 
ordinance. 
that, ". 
The Maitland ordinance reads: 
(a) When lands are subdivided within 
the city, at least five per cent (5%) of 
the gross area of such lands shall be 
dedicated by the owner to the city for 
park and recreation purposes. The loca-
tion of such park and recreation area 
shall be recommended by the planning and 
Zoning commission, to the city council 
for its approval. 
(b) If, in the judgment of the city 
council, the land to be subdivided is too 
small for a park or recreation area to be 
dedicated from such land, then the own-
er shall pay to the city a sum of money, 
equal to five per cent (5%) of the value 
of the gross area, which shall be held in 
escrow and used by the city for the pur-
pose of acquiring parks and recreation 
areas and for no other purpose. 
In that case the court had little trouble in findinc 
. the language of said section is so overbroad as t: 
render the section invalid." 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
The court should re-hear the case to consider the 
constitutional issues. The court should rule the West Jordan 
ordinance unconstitutional. 
- +"\..-
DATED this ~~ day of January, 1980. 
Robert J. DeBry 
Attorney for Plainti fs-Appellants 
2040 East 4800 South, Suite 203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 278-4439 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Substitute 
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